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Abstract 
Democratic processes the world over have exhibited tremendous challenges of diverse dimensions especially in 
emerging African states that are struglling to enthrone this valuable approach to management and public 
governance  
 
Introduction:   
What makes youth prone to engage in violent movements? And what program strategies show the greatest 
potential to moderate this risk? A number of research works recently undertook investigations in order to better 
comprehend or understand these questions, based on data from a number of youth empowerment projects in 
different African countries. These studies have shed more light on the debate over whether young people’s 
economic conditions are a major driver of violence. They also seemed to have provided hard evidence on a 
number of social, political, and economic factors that influence youth propensity towards violence in developing 
countries. The findings in general have clear implications for peace building programs in environments like 
Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda and several others where underlying tensions are known to have periodically erupted 
into violent conflicts. The results of these studies hugely lend support to the further use of economic incentives 
and promoting social integration among youth as pillars of peace building programs in these contexts. These 
researches also point to the need to expand young people’s political and civic engagement to significantly reduce 
their risk of participation in violent movements. Several of such programs in these countries have already 
internalized this lesson and are promoting constructive avenues for political participation among youth alongside 
efforts to improve their economic independence. Recently, a newspaper report declared that over 10,000 youths 
have been trained in diverse fields in Taraba State, North East Nigeria, in order to stem the tide of politically 
motivated violence that has engulfed the native Jukuns, Tivs, Fulanis and the Hausas who are predominant in the 
region as clearly enunciated by the Leadership (June 2001) and the Daily Trust (Feb., 2011) similar number of 
the politically created Yankalare group in Gombe State, North-East Nigeria, were similarly reported as receiving 
training in diverse trades and skills and this initiative is financed by the State government.  
 
Diverse Contexts of Violence 
It seems easy to be positive about the statement which ordinarily asserts that some of our societies live in violent 
time. One needs to however reflect back on the assassinations of Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sir Akintola, General 
Murtala Mohammed, President John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Senator Robert F. Kennedy; the 
riots in many urban areas; police violence; the war in Biafra, the war in Vietnam; the Boko-Haram insurgency 
and the rising crime rate in different areas such as armed robbery, money laundering, human and drug trafficking 
e.t.c.  
In making further efforts towards understanding the situation, we need to distinguish between violence 
against people and violence against things. A world of difference between beating up or killing another person 
and stealing or destroying things exist. Only those for whom there is no difference between life and property will 
miss this important difference. Furthermore, we have to cleanly delineate the distinguishing features between 
incidental violence, which may arise out of actions of protest or affirmations of certain views, and intended 
violence, which is aimed at the violation of others. Although it is often not simple to draw a clear line of 
distinction between these two kinds of violence, by and large they represent two forms of violence which can be 
distinguished from each other 
The cry for 'law and order' which is raised in the name of stopping violence can equally be an 
expression of violence as it is often rooted in the "wish to use force to suppress unpopular opinions or attitudes"  
(Fromm, 1969).  Fromm also added that law and order is "an emotionally charged slogan which often speaks 
against minority violence, while the mood behind it may be just as violent as that which it claims to fight". 
Adding from Eric Fromm's discussion, we also delve into asking the same question he raised on whether 
violence is an inherent part of human nature. The affirmative answer to this question is old, Fromm [1969] said, 
and  further noting that- 
"From [Thomas] Hobbes to [Sigmund] Freud to Konrad Lorenz, the assumption has been that man is an 
inherently aggressive animal. This assumption was made by Freud in his concept of the life instinct and the 
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death instinct and by Freudian psychoanalysts who did not follow Freud in this assumption but postulated the 
existence of a destructive instinct in man. Lorenz shares the concept of an aggressive instinct and combines it 
with assumptions about inherited aggressiveness rooted in the evolution of men from animals. According to the 
psychoanalysts and Lorenz, aggressiveness is spontaneously produced within the nervous system. It grows and 
accumulates and must be expressed if it is not to explode against or without a person's intention. Aggressiveness 
in this view does not need a special stimulus or provocation. It arises by itself and seeks and finds those stimuli 
which give it a chance to express itself". (Eric Fromm, 1969) 
 
Youth and Political Violence:  
Politically motivated violence occurs in every society at some point during its existence, Young people are 
known to have invariably played a significant role in perpetrating acts of violence against society. Indeed, in a 
number of weak and emerging societies, political 'leaders' oftentimes play what many have described as a 
subversive role in manipulating and mobilizing young people to violently actualize, realize and further their own 
selfish political objectives. Mobilizing youth to commit political violence is not an inherently African problem, 
but is common in many societies around the world. Election offers a clear African perspective on the 
mobilization of youth in political violence. 
As enunciated earlier, young men and women get involved in violence for diverse and context-specific 
reasons. The prevailing theme in the commentary on youth and violence is that exclusion and lack of 
opportunities faced by young people leads to disillusionment and, in some cases, their participation in violence. 
Unemployment, insufficient educational opportunities, poor governance and social marginalization can lead to 
the deep disaffection of youth in society, increasing the likelihood of them resorting to anti-social activity and 
engagement in violence. 
However, it is important to recognize that there are many contexts where youth suffer from high levels 
of exclusion but do not participate in violence. One may ask, what distinguishes those who are mobilized from 
those who remain on the periphery? Analyzing other African contexts of political violence from which Nigeria 
and others may learn, there are a number of discernible factors that, taking into account the above-mentioned 
underlying conditions of social exclusion, can lead to youth being mobilized to engage in dangerous acts of 
violence. 
 
'Youth' - A Definitional Expedition:  
A clear understanding of the nature and dynamics of youth violence must be preceded by the need to define 
youth itself. The word youth has been defined variously by different scholars and organizations. Kenniston 
[1971:27], refers to youth as representing a period between adolescence and adulthood in a post-modern era. He 
restated emphatically that it is a new stage of life which millions of young people are known to have entered 
today. The United Nations Children Education Fund, UNICEF [1972] observes that those between the age of 15 
and 25 years as best described as youth.  Johnson(cited in Abhuere, 2000:85), on the other hand  argued that 
while leadership of youth programmes has no upper age limit, their membership has in real practice covered 
persons of over 35-45 years old.  Berger (1972:42) also insisted that youth cuts across age, pointing to culture as 
the major issue that really matters, adding that anyone who feels youthful, and exhibits such qualities as 
spontaneity, impulsiveness, energy, etc. should be considered as a youth. Many others have conceptualized that 
“youth” should just be viewed as a transitional stage in life between childhood and adulthood rather than as a 
rigid construct based on age. This crop of analysts further recognizes the diversity of youth by gender, class, 
ethnicity and focuses on the multiple dimensions of exclusion that have systematically disadvantaged the youth. 
It also take  a holistic approach to violence – recognizing that in practice different forms of violence [e.g. 
political, criminal, interpersonal, extremism] may formidably overlap and that some of the same structural and 
proximate factors may also drive youth engagement in different forms of violence. The United Nations General 
Assembly has defined ―youth as the age between 15 and 24. As we have seen earlier and as we will further see, 
there is no single agreed definition of whom and what constitutes ―youth, thus defining what constitute 'youth' 
ultimately varies between and amongst countries and organizations. The lowest age range for youth is 12 in 
Jordan and the upper age range is 35 in a number of African countries. The World Health Organization [WHO] 
use the term ―adolescent for those aged 10-19, ―youth for those 15-24, and ―young peopleǁ for those 10-24. 
According to Hilker and Fraser [2009], there is also a degree of overlap between international definitions 
of ―youth and ―children, with the Convention on the Rights of the Child [CRC] defining a child as everyone 
under the age of 18 ―unless under the law applicable to the child, maturity is attained earlier. Thus, this new life 
stage can be characterized as a period of semi-autonomy, when young people experiment with adult roles but do 
not fully commit to them (World Bank, 2007). A growing literature on the transition to adulthood and what it 
means to become an adult in different cultural contexts is largely available. Achievement of adulthood can be 
determined by various factors such as achieving economic independence, leaving the parental home, getting 
married and having children. In some societies, particular social or cultural rituals may also mark the transition 
Research on Humanities and Social Sciences                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN (Paper)2224-5766 ISSN (Online)2225-0484 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.17, 2016 
 
148 
to adulthood. In many cases, this transition to adulthood can be prolonged or shortened by many factors. At this 
point, it is crucial to recognize that “youth” is not a homogenous construct, but encapsulates several different 
experiences and diversities, for example according to gender, class, disability, ethnicity, education and 
provenance (e.g. region, rural/urban). In some distinct African cultures, female youth as a category scarcely 
exists, for example in Darfur females become women when they menstruate, before which point they are 
considered girls (Hilker and Fraser, 2009). Marc Sommers (2006) as reported Hilker and Fraser (2009) has also 
noted that in many contexts, motherhood tends to alter the social status of female youth far more than fatherhood 
changes the lives of male youth. To Hall, youth is viewed as a "recapitulation period". Gassets on the other hand 
[ as quoted in Abhuere [ 2000], also quoted in A.Y. Muhammad], views youth as a "maturation process". Freud 
[as quoted in Abhuere, 2000] sees it as a "psycho-sexual period of lack of experience that falls between 
childhood and adulthood". On his part,  Friedmann, as Abhuere [2000] reported youth are viewed as a "group 
that have reached puberty, but not yet acquired the full rights and duties of adult life, such as marriage, family 
and earning of living".  
 
Youth Violence - An Explanation: 
Having defined youth, it is pertinent to define violence and restate what in specific constitutes youth violence. 
The word violence like youth lends itself to different interpretations. To avoid confusion in defining and 
reviewing the term 'violence' in this study, we shall use the use of Corsini’s (1999) definition which sees 
violence more as "the expression of hostility and rage through physical force directed against a person or 
property". 
Against this background, that this paper conveniently define youth violence as essentially a deviant or 
gang subculture. More than a few literature on gang subculture have dealt with the criminal behavior of 
adolescent youths from working class background i.e. street corner gangs e.t.c. as evinced Ifaturoti (1994:150). 
In essence, therefore, youth violence is demonstrative of profound deviant characteristics, which further suggest 
an abnormal situation, making youth become directly liable to being involved in a series of illegal or anti-social 
activities. Youth violence, as used in this work, refers to abnormal practices of youth. Most of the cases we have 
seen and examined are largely about youths whose behavior run counter to the accepted standards of the society. 
As Cohen (1965) succinctly puts it, these groups of people usually have related problems. Some of them are 
direct products of broken homes. Some, especially the hawkers, beggars, touts, resort to violent acts because 
their parents are poor, and there exist no alternative for them. Furthermore, we must restate that the deviant 
activities of these gangs must be interpreted as an open manifestation of protest against the circumambient 
injustice and corruption with which they have to contend on a daily basis  as Albert [1997] asserted. Such 
gangsters, as definably noted Redl and Wineman [1951], do not often see anything wrong in what they do but 
rationalize their activities by bending the general rules of the society to suit their own odd circumstances, which 
of course is a critical negation of what is defined as the accepted behavioral standards. Often delinquents have 
exhibited their propensity for deviance from accepted norms because: [a] many other 'normal' people are known 
to do similar things; [b] they simply lack 'better' option; [c] they want to be heard in the society, Albert [1997] 
again reiterated. It is once again interesting to note that deviant youths often have peculiar life styles by which 
they are identified and even often feared by the general populace in which they operate. 
 
Political Parties and Recruitment of Youth as Agents of Political Violence - A Reflection 
Henrik Urdal [2006] has asserted that "exceptionally large youth cohorts, the so-called “youth bulges,” make 
countries more susceptible to political violence. Within two prominent theoretical frameworks in the study of 
civil war, youth bulges are argued to potentially increase both opportunities and motives for political violence".  
Urdal, has, thus, concluded that "this claim is empirically tested in a time-series cross-national statistical model 
for internal armed conflict for the period 1950–2000, and for event data for terrorism and rioting for the years 
1984–1995".  
The results are consistent both with an expectation that youth bulges provide greater opportunities for 
violence through the abundant supply of youths with low opportunity costs, and with an expectation that stronger 
motives for violence may arise as youth bulges are more likely to experience institutional crowding, in particular 
unemployment". Urdal [2006] further argued that some contextual factors have been suggested to potentially 
enhance the effect of youth 'bulges' or surging youth populationǁ, again reinforcing the position that youth bulges 
are particularly associated with an increasing risk of internal armed conflict in what he describes as "starkly 
autocratic regimes" and also even in "highly democratic countries". In a different sense, however, and 
specifically too, human faculty is disbelieved to be  man's suggestibility. If his leaders try to make him believe 
that he is or will be threatened, and if he lacks critical judgment and is prone to accept as reality what his leaders 
tell him is real, he will react to the alleged threats in the same way he reacts to a real threat. It does not really 
matter whether he is really threatened; what matters is whether he is abundantly convinced of the threat, and this 
very importantly depends upon the degree of his dependence on his leaders, his suggestibility, and his apparent 
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lack of critical thinking. Descriptively therefore, this is 'reactive aggressiveness' and it is characterized by the 
fact that it is provoked by a real or alleged threat to vital interests of people. It also disappears when the threat 
has been warded off, and that the aggressive act is itself purpose-determined and does not produce any 
considerable amount of what is often seen or described as 'lustful feeling'. Several more specific and probably 
more empirical scenarios have been identified by a number of studies in their bid to unearth how the youth are 
'conscripted' or perhaps how they are lured into desperate acts of violence. Amongst them principally are the 
following:  
Politics of Identity: Young people may be drawn to defend their own ethnic base or political ideologies through 
the use of violence. In Rwanda, thousands of disaffected Hutu youth, known as interhamwe, were infamously 
mobilized through the use of political propaganda and hate-inspiring media during the 1994 genocide, to 
catastrophic effect. Nigeria has not been essentially insulated from this brand of political propaganda when one 
views Ansari Dokubo's ethnically inspired hatred against the so-called "North" or "Hausa-Fulani".  It is 
pertinent to state this in the light of the clear realization that hate and destructiveness are impulses which obscure 
rational and objective thinking and easily create a serious polarization in that they reinforce each other on both 
sides of the political spectrum. This is indeed where the danger actually lies!  
Indoctrination and Abduction Techniques: Many young people participate in violent activities because they 
are forced to, through elaborate techniques including abduction and indoctrination. Many armed conflicts were 
artificially prolonged through the incessant abduction of children who were forced to fight on the other side. 
These experiences have been most effectively dramatized in the conflicts in  North-East Nigeria involving the 
Boko-Haram and the political conflict that reigned for a long time in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo. The use of child soldiers till today remains a veritable 'military' tool or strategy used by several 
African political or rebel groups such as MASOP, M-23 or even the FDLR. 
Yan St. Pierre, the CEO of the Berlin-based security consulting firm MOSECON has according to a 
VOA Report, quoted by the Nigerian Sun Newspaper [Aug, 2014] said that Kidnap victims in Nigeria are 
strengthening Boko-Haram by increasing the strength of their army, adding that "once the group was just trying 
to survive, he says it (Boko-Haram) is now trying to take over territories". According to Pierre, "Boko-Haram is 
now planning strategically long-term, It’s not about replenishing forces. It’s about acquiring more personnel", he 
asserted. Records also have indicated, the paper added, Boko-Haram has killed thousands of people this year 
alone in a growing, five-year-old insurgency and it has also displaced over a million people. The group — which 
says it wants to enforce a version of Islamic law — is increasingly becoming well-armed and well-funded. St. 
Pierre further said the insurgents are also using the tactics pioneered by Joseph Kony in Uganda and Charles 
Taylor, ex-Liberian warlord, in Sierra Leone, to gain loyalty by all means from kidnap and abduction victims. He 
added that kidnap victims, including children, are sometimes forced to kill people they know or love. "By 
making them kill their own parents or their own family it makes them be in a position where they can’t go back," 
he again opined. "Psychologically they are absolutely broken. They killed their parents. They literally murdered 
what brought them to life.  In that sense, their loyalty becomes to the only family that they have now, which is 
the army or the terrorist group that kidnapped them", St. Pierre maintained. He again said Boko-Haram also 
kidnap girls and women, including the more than 200 schoolgirls abducted many months ago, to use as 
household help, sex slaves and most recently, bombers.  At least nine people were killed in four attacks by 
female suicide bombers in Kano, North West Nigeria. Two other girls, the report continued, were arrested, one 
was a 10 year old strapped with a bomb. "They’re taking these little girls now and using them as weapons," St. 
Pierre said. "So it’s a double use by kidnapping girls". On the other hand, the report said, the Nigerian military 
will not concede any portion of this country to terrorists or any such group",  Major General Chris Olukolade, a 
defense spokesman declared. However, a Boko-Haram "takeover" may not be what it sounds like. If villagers are 
terrified into pledging loyalty to Boko-Haram, the group can essentially control the area without hanging flags or 
building walls as observed the Sun Newspaper. 
Trigger Political events: Events such as elections and political activities may hugely trigger acts of violence, 
particularly when underlying ethnic and social tensions are already existent. In early 2008, the disputed election 
results in Kenya led to running battles between the tribal support bases of the opposing political blocs - the Party 
of National Unity [PNU] and the Orange Democratic Movement [ODM] - resulting in over a thousand deaths. 
The Mungiki, a notorious gang which draws its members largely from the Kikuyu ethnic group, were responsible 
for orchestrating widespread violence during the post-election period, mobilizing unemployed and disaffected 
youth from impoverished areas to carry out acts of mayhem and violence, in retaliation for violent acts 
committed by pro-ODM youth, who are largely comprised of the Kalenjin. That the two previously warring 
ethnic blocs in 2008 – the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin – now share executive power in Kenya following the 2013 
election, shows how malleable political and tribal differences can be in African societies. In 2011, following the 
declaration of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan as winner of the presidential elections against his major contender, 
Muhammadu Buhari, a Fulani man of Northern extraction and who was largely adjudged as more popular, the 
country especially its Northern axis was engulfed in real violence with members of both the PDP, CPC and the 
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ordinary citizens suffering extensive casualties in terms of loss of lives and property. The CPC and their 
supporters claimed that the election was fraught with extensive rigging. INEC, the election management body 
was accused of manipulating the elections in favor of the declared winner, Jonathan Goodluck, an Ituoke 
tribesman from the oil producing Niger-Delta region of Nigeria.  
Weak and Limited Security Network: Weak capacity and control of state security provision; abuse of state 
force [human rights abuses, oppressive policing , as was noticed in the early days the Boko-Haram incursions 
etc]; presence of non-state security actors; availability of small arms and light weapons, which have become 
accessible from some key conflict sites, such as Libya, Liberia and Algeria in Africa; existence of external threat; 
regional / border conflict; international military involvement.  
Socializing with the Norms of Violence:  As a means of maintaining existing power structures, individuals 
and political bodies expectedly employ strategies of recruiting marginalized young people and socializing them 
in norms of violence, incentivizing them by appealing to their desire for status, identity and group cohesion.  As 
enunciated A Y Mohammed in his article titled "Youth Violence in the Fourth Republic…"  the elites in Nigeria, 
like in many African countries, have equally helped in promoting  youth engagement in violent activities. He 
further cited them as representing essentially "the capitalists who depend on the state machinery for survival" as 
quoted in Joseph [1999], adding that they are also a major player in the ethnic game for exploitation and 
manipulation of non-elites, usually directed towards personal/elite groups interests, which mostly promotes 
division and hatred among people in pluralistic societies. This viewpoint is further reinforced by Otite [1990]. 
These elites Mohammed continued, deploy the "use ethnic and religious sentiment in order to achieve their 
political and socio-economic goals" citing further the example of a Sokoto Prince who in his address to youth 
corpers posted to the state, in 1986, publicly expressed that the Hausa race is superior to other ethnic groups in 
Nigeria. Hassan M. Kukah [2002] extensively made reference to this statement.  Mohammed, again, expressed 
that the others too, in reference to the Yoruba and the Igbo, have the same belief.  In many other instances, he 
conclusively declared, the elites often sponsor youths in ethno-religious, political and cult violence. Such a 
situation, Mohammed further noted "sets an appalling role model for youths and increases their vulnerability to 
or penchant for violent crime". Obateru [1994:132] also noted that poverty apparently accounts for the bulk of 
violence due to such problems as unemployment, inadequate housing, physical and social infrastructures, as we 
have earlier been made to see. The current situation in Nigeria must have implicitly worsened the situation 
Obateru [1994], who also further observed that the situation of youths in the country, has rendered them idle and 
almost hopeless, hence they have become "instruments of manipulation by the elites for ethno-religious and 
political insurrections".   
In the previous elections in Zimbabwe, a usual tactic of the reigning ZANU-PF's political machine was 
to recruit and indoctrinate affected young people into its so-called "youth wing", mobilizing them to intimidate 
and attack voters and political opponents.  In many other African societies, young people have been the 
victims of policy neglect and excluded from decision-making processes. When patriarchal power structures 
exclude young people, violence can often be a way of venting their frustration, seizing control and making a 
significant impact. Unfortunately, the prevailing stereotype of youth involvement in African politics is that of the 
party-political thug and violent acolyte who may be mobilized during election periods to intimidate political 
opponents and voters.  
Series of analyses of recent episodes of political violence in Africa have indicated that youth are 
manipulated and mobilized when needed, but otherwise marginalized and ignored by the political elite, 
especially when it comes to addressing the root causes of their social exclusion. Currently, there is huge 
campaign in Nigeria recently which tend to depict that the "political elites only use the children of others while 
theirs are fortified in European and American schools in pursuit of their studies" claimed a woman political 
activist in Kaduna at an organized forum for youth education. A recurrent election strategy used by Zimbabwe's 
ZANU-PF for example since the 80s, has been the political mobilization of unemployed youth, mostly males, 
and sometimes women, to attack opposition supporters and their property. Zimbabwe’s 2008 election was no 
different, with the country submerged by a wave of state sponsored violence and intimidation in the run-up to the 
Presidential election. Many young men became involved in quasi-military groups, such as the ZANU-PF youth 
militias. ZANU-PF youth wing was indeed at the forefront of committing acts of violence. Moreover, the 
perpetrators of violence were the beneficiaries of police inaction or party protection, further engendering a 
culture of political impunity. Economic and educational opportunities for young people in many African 
countries remain extremely limited. While social exclusion of young people has undoubtedly been a factor in 
several of our experiences of youths in political violence, the principal driver has been the degree to which their 
engagement in violence has been actively promoted and sanctioned by the ruling party.  
Clearly, youth are seen as crucial actors in realizing political goals. If political leaders can rapidly and 
effectively mobilize youth to become violent agents of political change on a widespread scale, then equally, it 
should follow naturally that youth can be mobilized to become peaceful participants in the political processes, 
the legitimacy of which are irrevocably dirtied when violence informs the ultimate result. Improving and 
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encouraging the peaceful participation of youth in politics and peace-building initiatives will increase the social 
capital of Zimbabwean society and reduce the prevalence of violence in times of political transition. However, in 
the present, leaders are expected to lead, and in 2015 Nigeria has the chance to show the world that it has 
consigned the practice of manipulating youth to commit political violence to where it belongs - the pages of 
history. 
Governance Incompetence and Limited Participatory Politics:  It is often believed that Participation in the 
formal political process may not necessarily provide the youth with an ideal outlet for the expression of their 
cogent needs, aspirations or even their most profound grievances. Several scenarios have indicated that young 
people are more commonly raised in countries that are characterized by the existence of a conservative "power 
structures, patronage networks and intergenerational hierarchies, which exclude them from decision-making and 
do not meet their needs". Where youth feel existing power structures marginalize them and in some cases 
obliterate them, violence can provide an ideal opportunity to have a voice, lead and make a resounding bang. 
 
Conclusion 
Hilker and Fraser [2009] in their report titled "Youth Exclusion, Violence, Conflict and Fragile States" prepared 
for the DFID, extensively quoted Frances Stewart's all-encompassing "Grievance perspectives", strongly argued 
that "relative deprivation or exclusion fuels conflict and that violence is a rational means to address grievances. 
These grievances might be economic – such as poverty, economic recession or inequality; political – such as 
lack of democracy, lack of minority rights or political participation; or socio-cultural – such as lack of language 
rights, destruction of cultural tradition etc. Central to ―grievance arguments are arguments about inter-ethnic 
or ―horizontal inequalities". The report further argued that  "…horizontal inequalities [defined as ―inequalities 
in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups] are an important 
cause of violent conflict". Hilker and Fraser [2009] also added that this viewpoint has been further reinforced by 
the results of " …eight case studies in Latin America, Southeast Asia and West Africa [from protests/armed 
struggle in Chiapas [Mexico] to civil war in Uganda and Sri Lanka]" adding that  "there is an increased 
probability of conflict occurring where socio-economic horizontal inequalities are high, especially when these 
are consistent with political inequalities"  
While for instance, youth policy and programmes seek to produce skilled and productive workers, 
especially through training, they also aim at having dedicated and qualitative leadership through the effective 
mobilization, for service of the already well-qualified youths. A combination of these factors is expected to 
promote overall national goals of development. Here, education [which translates into human investment] is 
expected to do the ultimate magic. Hence, these Nigeria and other developing states should be seen to organize 
youth at two levels: one for the less fortunate youth and another for the elitist ones amongst them. The final aim 
is to harness and channel their energies for national development.  Margaret Thatcher, one time British prime 
minister, asserted that " young people ought not to be idle…it is very bad for them" Times [London]. It is 
therefore right to say that the apparent neglect of youths in the Nigeria’s development plans has been one of the 
sources of youth violence in the country. American psychoanalyst and social philosopher Erich Fromm stressed 
the importance of social and economic factors on human behavior. His focus was a departure from traditional 
psychoanalysis, which emphasized the role of the subconscious.  In his 1969 essay published in the Collier’s 
Year Book, Fromm presented various explanations for human violence. He argued that violence cannot be 
controlled by imposing stronger legal penalties, but rather more fundamentally by creating a more just society in 
which people connect with each other as humans and are able to control their own lives.  In practical sense, it is 
often unequal access to education that can become a major source for tension, which may likely lead to 
rebellions, conflict and violence. The nature and quality of education are also important, as the mismatch 
between the content of education and job opportunities available can be a source of frustration and school 
curricula can be a powerful means of mobilization and indoctrination. Therefore, it is fundamental to observe 
that functional education which emphasizes Entrepreneurship training,  is vital in revolutionizing the content of 
education and in impacting positively towards getting a functionally educated youth population. Thus, in an 
educational system that places emphasis on entrepreneurship education, it may be possible to achieve an 
effective match between curriculum content and the opportunities for job creation in various areas. The end 
result of a combination of these strategies, would be a more organized society in which youth's abundant 
prowess in different aspects of human life, could be effectively harnessed and channeled for genuine 
development. 
 Also, in are more specific sense, programs that are designed to target the youth in many developing 
countries should also be seen to emphasize the following key composite approaches:  
a.  Full multi-level and multi-sectoral youth programs that clearly address diverse issues that are of specific 
concern to the youth in a more definable context should be promoted.  Programs here are meant to focus on 
integrating young people into the labor market and/or their communities through capacity building, skills 
training, income-generating activities, peace-building and community empowerment. 
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b. Youth and peace-building programmes that seeks to engage young people directly in democracy and peace-
building activities as a means to empower youth, to mobilize and exploit their energies and capacities as a force 
for change and to prevent them from being drawn into renewed violence. Programs that places great emphasis on 
peace education especially in our schools/tertiary institutions, training in rights issues, peace-building and 
conflict resolution, and the direct but positive involvement of youth in elections and human rights monitoring 
and voice, transparency and accountability programs. 
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